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HOLDING YOUR HORSES: A VIOLATION OF THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Matthew J Whitley*
INTRODUCTION

Upton Sinclair may as well have been referring to state
judicial behavior under the dormant Commerce Clause when he
penned, "It is difficult to get a man to understand something when
his salary depends upon his not understanding it."' Indeed, state
judges are far more likely to uphold local and state laws than their
federal counterparts. 2 In a widely praised piece of scholarship,
Professor Mehmet K. Konsar-Steenberg suggests that such "home
team" treatment is exacerbated by modern readings of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that invite, if not demand,
3
judges to express policy bias in their decisions. Such "ideological
bias," however, is generally stifled when a law is deemed
4
discriminatory and consequently reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Recently, in Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse .Racing
Commission, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld a regulation
prohibiting a horse claimed in Kentucky from racing elsewhere
until the close of entries of the meeting at which the horse was
claimed, finding that the regulation did not violate the dormant

Editor-in-Chief, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, & NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW, 2017-2018; B.S. 2012, University of Louisville; M.A. 2014, Marian
University; J.D. expected May 2018, University of Kentucky.
I UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND How I GOT LICKED 109
(1935).

Free
2 Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg & Anne F. Peterson, Forum, Federalism, and
Markets:An EmpiricalStudy of JudicialBehavior Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 80 UMKC L. Rev. 139, at 140 (2011) (Study noted that although state courts "are
not so much influenced by the need to cultivate a strong constituency for re-election, judges'
decisions do tend to reflect the state's general policy priorities.").
3 Id. at 144(The author particularly referenced the Pike balancing test developed
by the Supreme Court); see generallyPikev. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
4 Konar-Steenberg & Peterson, supra note 2, at 144 (However, even where laws
were alleged to be facially discriminatory or discriminatory in effect, "state courts upheld
challenged laws 82% and 92% of the time, respectively ... while the corresponding uphold
rates in federal courts [were] lower: 74% and 77%."); see also id. at 155.
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Commerce Clause.5 In reviewing the regulation, Kentucky
employed the simple balancing test articulated in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.6 The Pike balancing test ("balancing test"), in
weighing a law's burdens on interstate commerce against its
benefits, holds that a law willbe found unconstitutional if the court
decides that the law's burdens on interstate commerce exceeds its
benefits.7
In determining that the regulation was non-discriminatory,
the court opted not to apply strict scrutiny and instead applied the
balancing test; yet the facts presented in Jamgotchian seem
emblematic of the very types of issues that should require the most
exacting scrutiny. This Note takes issue with the Kentucky
Supreme Court's application of the balancing test in lieu of strict
scrutiny, a decision which was flawed in three respects: (1) it rests
on the court's declaration that the regulation was not meaningfully
discriminatory; (2) it dismisses the protectionist nature and
extraterritorial impact of the regulation; and (3) it fails to require
the Commission to establish that the regulation was the least
discriminatory alternative to reaching its regulatory goal. This
Note does not argue whatthe court's disposition should have been,
but only how it should have been reached. The goal of this Note is
to underscore an arguably analytically deficient application of the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to a state regulation.
This analysis proceeds as follows: Part I more formally
reviews the dynamic history of the dormant Commerce Clause and
its analytic structure. Generally, the threshold issue under the
dormant Commerce Clause is whether the state regulation at issue
affects interstate commerce. For the purpose of such analysis, the
Supreme Court has broadly defined the scope of commerce among
the states. In fact, the court has expansively stated that "all objects
of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause Protection."8
Part II explains the historical background of thoroughbred
racing in Kentucky. Specifically, this section will address the
development of claiming races and claiming jail, respectively, as
well as the regulatory agency that promulgated those laws. Part
III describes Jamgotchian, and the basis of the trial, appellate, and
5 Jamgotchian

2016).
6 Pike,

v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594, 620 (Ky.

397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Id. at 142.
8 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
7
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state supreme court's rationale in reaching their conclusions. Part
IV proposes that the court should have applied a strict scrutiny
line of analysis. This part explains why strict scrutiny provides
theoretical clarity to the dormant Commerce Clause, and
consequently a more definite evaluative framework of the
regulation while removing the unpredictability and arbitrariness
of the balancing test. Accordingly, this analysis captures the
rationale as to why the balancing test was an inappropriate
method for assessing the burdens the regulation imposed on
interstate commerce. Moreover, it stresses that the Jamgotchian
court's attempted importation of the balancing test illustrates a
break from firmly established jurisprudential thought.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
The Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the
9
authority "[tlo regulate commerce ... among the several States."
The federal courts have consistently construed this positive grant
of authority to include a "restriction on permissible state
10
regulation," commonly known as the dormant Commerce Clause.
The dormant Commerce Clause has been interpreted to invalidate
state statutes that impose economic or commercial burdens, or
"discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its origin
or destination out of state."" The Supreme Court has devised a
number of tests to preempt such state laws.
The dormant Commerce Clause is primarily concerned with
economic protectionism-regulatory actions "designed to benefit
out-of-state
burdening
by
interests
economic
in-state
1 2 If a law is declared discriminatory, because it
competitors."
expressly draws a distinction between in-staters and out-of-staters
(i.e., facial discrimination), it is presumed unconstitutional and
"invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local
purpose and of the absence of non-discriminatory alternatives."13
The Court has observed that "State [regulations] that discriminate

9 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
10 Dep't of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008).
11 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
12 Davis, 553 U.S. at 337-38. (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273-74 (1988)).
1s Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
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against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of
invalidity."1 4 Such discriminatory state regulations rarely satisfy
the standard needed to prove a legitimate local purpose or absence
of alternative measures.' 5
An alternative dormant Commerce Clause analysis is
applied when a court determines that a particular regulation is
non-discriminatory but nevertheless intrudes upon interstate
commerce. In this context, a simple balancing test is used. "Where
the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."16
Both tests-strict scrutiny and balancing-form the core of
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In addition, the Court
requires that state regulations, subjected to either test, endure a
"least restrictive means" analysis. 17 Notably, the Court has never

struck down a non-discriminatory state regulation on the basis
that its goal could have been achieved through a less burdensome
measure.' 8 Only discriminatory state regulations have been
invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause due to the
presence of a less restrictive alternative.1 9 Thus, in reality, the
"least restrictive means" test is only used in conjunction with strict
scrutiny. 20
The dormant Commerce Clause also prohibits state laws
that regulate extraterritorially. Admittedly, however, the scope of
the extraterritoriality doctrine is somewhat unclear. The Supreme
Court has provided that "[t]he critical inquiry is whether the
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State." 2 1 The Court has further provided that
state laws directly or indirectly regulating commerce occurring
14

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (internal quotations removed).

' Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (Rare exception which held
that a ban on

the importation of a particular type of bait fish did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause).
,6 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970).
17 Id.

18 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 455

(4th ed. 2011).
19 E.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
20 See id.
21 Healy v. Beer Institute. 491 U.S. 324 (1989)
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"wholly outside of the State's borders" are invalid per se, "whether
22
or not the commerce has effects in the state."
II. THE THOROUGHBRED RACING REGULATORY REGIME

A. The Kentucky Horse Racing Commission
Since 1906, public acceptance of thoroughbred racing and
oversight of industry related gambling has been a legislative
Commission
Horse Racing
Kentucky
of the
concern
(Commission)-an agency created by the General Assembly
pursuant to KRS 230.23 In a lengthy statement of legislative intent,
the General Assembly charged the Commission with prescribing
administrative regulations and conditions for "all legitimate horse
racing and wagering," to ensure that all meets were "free of any
corrupt, dishonest, or unprincipled horse racing practices .... "24
Indeed, in the early twentieth century, establishing the
Commission was necessary to combat public opposition to
gambling-a resistance stemming from the expansive temperance
25
movement that gripped the country. But, despite this movement
26
the General
leading many states to abandon horse racing,
Assembly's creation of the Commission allowed Kentucky to stave
off that fate by promoting public confidence in the industry. To
promote such confidence, it was particularly necessary that the
27
To fulfill that
races were fair and genuinely competitive.
for grading
system
elaborate
an
developed
industry
necessity, the
28
systems
grading
the
put,
thoroughbred racing ability. Simply
were designed to make racing more transparent, by publicizing the
caliber of horses involved in a given race, and to insure that races
29
consisted of horses of roughly equivalent ability. For highergraded classes, entry conditions and handicapping by track
30
officials were implemented to further ensure competitiveness.
22 Id. at 336.
23
24
25

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.215(2) (LexisNexis 2017) (emphasis added).
Id.
Jamgotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594, 612 (Ky. 2016).

26 Id.
27 Id.

28 Id.

29 Id.
o Id
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Tracks were limited, however, in their ability to provide adequate
handicapping.31 Enter the claiming race.
B. ClaimingRaces
The Commission, in its capacity as a Kentucky regulatory
agency, has defined a claiming race as "any race in which every
horse running in the race may be transferred" subject to further
regulations. 32 Moreover, "[i]n claiming races a horse shall be
subject to claim for its entered price by a licensed owner in good
standing." 33 As commentators have noted, "[tihe purpose of the
claiming race is to keep owners from entering superior horses in
mediocre fields ... and to foster competitive races." 34 This purpose
is achieved by clearly establishing a price prior to a race, with an
understanding that any horse entered into that race is being
offered for sale at that price. For example, if the claim price for a
field in a given race is set at $30,000 and an eligible claimant
makes a valid claim prior to the running of the race, the animal
must be sold at $30,000. The general effect is that owners tempted
to gain an advantage by running a superior horse against an
inferior field are deterred by the risk of losing their horse for less
than its value.35

C. ClaimingJail
The claiming rule, however, fell victim to claimants who
treated such races as "sales ring[s] in which ... clever [horsemen]
or [dealers could] pick up a bargain and sell it at will."3 6 In fact,
stewards expressed that the rule had exposed owners "to claims by
out-of-state horsemen who came to ... meets with the purpose of
claiming large numbers of horses in order to take them to other
racing States and sell them." 3 7 Accordingly, what are commonly
referred to as "claiming jail" restrictions were adopted across
a1 Id. at 612.
32

Id. (citing 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:001(12) (2011)).

33 Id.

34 United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chi. Downs Ass'n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781, 784 (7th

Cir. 1981).

35

TOM BIRACREE & WENDR INSINGER, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF
THOROUGHBRED

HORSE RACING 217 (1982).
36

37

Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 274 A.2d 102, 104 (Md.
1971).
Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 614.
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several states, including Kentucky, to mitigate what were
perceived as abusive claiming practices.
In relevant part, Kentucky's claiming jail regulations (i.e.,
Article 6) establish that claimed horses are prohibited from: (1)
being transferred within thirty days after they were claimed
except by entry in other claiming races; and (2) racing elsewhere
prior to the close of entries of the meeting at which the horse was
claimed unless otherwise granted permission by a steward to enter
38
overlapping and conflicting races in Kentucky. Persons who
violate Article 6 regulations are subject to fines, license
suspension, and other sanctions.3 9

III. THE J4MGOTCHZANCASE
A. Lower Courts
In 2011, Jeremy Jamgotchian claimed a horse at Churchill
Downs. 40 Notwithstanding Article 6, however, Jamgotchian
41
attempted to enter his claimed horse in several out-of-state races.
He was barred from doing so and consequently brought suit in
state court, claiming that Article 6 regulations violated the
dormant Commerce Clause "either because they discriminate
against interstate commerce or because they burden that
commerce unreasonably." 4 2 The trial court granted summary
43
judgment in favor of the Commission. The court supported its
decision by invoking what is considered a standard two-tiered
44
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The initial question was
whether the challenged state regulation discriminated against
interstate commerce. The court concluded that it did not, reasoning
that it applied evenhandedly between Kentucky residents and
non-residents.4 5 Next, since the challenged regulation was
declared non-discriminatory, the court then applied the balancing
test-asking whether "the burden imposed on interstate commerce
§1(6) (2007) (emphasis added).
See 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028 (2016).
Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 600.
Id.

38 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:015,
39
40
41

d

42

43
44

M. at 601.
Id.

4 5Id
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[was] clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits."46 The
court reasoned, because of its limited duration, that the regulation
had a nominal effect on interstate commerce, whereas its benefit
to Kentucky's thoroughbred racing industry was substantial.4 7
According to the court, the regulations served to mitigate abusive
claiming practices, that depleted the supply of horses at a given
meet, and encouraged larger racing fields."
The trial court fortified its conclusion by citing a line of
cases which hold,49 as characterized by the court, that "government
action[s] in discharging traditional government functions are
outside the scope of the restrictions of the Commerce Clause."5 0
The court interpreted this holding to apply to the horse racing
industry, reasoning that for more than a century the horse racing
industry "has been so heavily regulated and infused with a public
interest as to meet the broad criteria for traditional government
function contemplated by the Supreme Court."5 1 This suggests that
even if there were some question about the constitutionality of
Article 6 under the dormant Commerce Clause, any doubt would
yield to the Supreme Court's deference to states' "traditional
governmental functions."
The trial court's decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. 52 That court more fully embraced the lower court's
traditional government function line of analysis. In fact, the court
expressly stated that the promulgation of Article 6 by the
Commission constituted "a traditional governmental function
because it directly satisfied every factor the United States
46 Id. at 604.

7 Id. at 606.
8 Id. at 611.
9 See United Haulers Ass'n., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,

550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding that "laws favoring government can be deemed nondiscriminatory for Commerce Clause purposes, and can be upheld without the rigorous

scrutiny typically applied to laws favoring in-state businesses vis-A-vis out-of-state
competition, since '11 aws favoring local government... may be directed toward any number
of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism); see also Dep't of Revenue of Kentucky v.
Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (arguing that the rationale of United Haulersapplies with even
greater force to laws favoring a State's municipal bonds, given that the issuance of debt
securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with venerable
history").
50 Jamgotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, Judge.
Action No. 11-CI-01-01047
(Franklin Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2012).
5' Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 602.
5
2 Jamgotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 851, at
*1 (Ky.
Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2014).
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53
Supreme Court articulated in Davis." The Court of Appeals,

having concluded that the Commission was engaged in their
"traditional governmental function," enthusiastically declared
that the "benefits of the Regulation outweigh the trivial burden the
Regulation may place on interstate commerce."
B. Kentucky Supreme Court
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed much of the lower
court's ruling, but rejected the courts' reliance on the "traditional
government function" line of analysis. A unanimous bench agreed
that thoroughbred racing did not constitute a traditional
government function. 54 Rather, the Court reasoned that Churchill
Downs, 55 along with other licensed racing associations in
Kentucky, were "private enterprises ... [whose] main concern [was]

their shareholders."5 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, generally
embraced the lower courts' application of the two-tiered analysis,
opting to apply the balancing test rather than strict scrutiny. The
court reasoned that in spite of Article 6 containing a "modicum of
discrimination," it was only a portion of a larger, nondiscriminatory racing-as opposed to trade-regulation and its
protectionist effect was negligible relative to its benefits to
57
Kentucky's thoroughbred racing industry. The court further
noted that Jamgotchian grossly overstated the protectionist intent
and effect of Article 6, explaining that its purpose was not to
insulate Kentucky's race tracks from non-resident competition but
rather to preserve a practice in which thoroughbred racing
58
remains sustainable and publicly acceptable.
53 Id. at *12.
5 Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 608.
55 Track where Jamgotchian claimed his horse.
56 Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 609 (The Kentucky Supreme Court went on to
further reject the Commission's claim that Kentucky's regulation of horse racing was itself
a traditional government function. The Court reasoned that "regulation by itself cannot be
what the Supreme Court meant in United Haulers by the phrase 'traditional government
function,' because... [it] would call into question every case in which a regulation has been
invalidated under the sort of strict scrutiny frequently applied to regulations that
discriminate against interstate commerce").
57 Id. at 610.
58 Id. at 611 (To stress the accuracy of its conclusion, the bench belabored the long
history and central importance claiming races as a staple in the thoroughbred racing
industry).
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The court next concluded that the effect of Article 6 was also

not protectionist.5 9 The court determined that claiming "jail" did
not give Kentucky's tracks any sort of meaningful advantage over
non-resident tracks because, even while Kentucky maintains
"access to horses jailed in-state, it loses access to horses jailed
elsewhere."60 The court noted that the very "mutuality of such
restrictions is undoubtedly the explanation" for Jamgotchian
challenging Article 6 as opposed to one of the "elsewhere tracks at
which a claimed horse" is restricted from leaving.6 1 The bench,
however, distinguished this happening from the sort of
protectionist retaliation that the Commerce Clause was meant to
preclude. 62 The court reemphasized that the rule was not
protectionist in its intent, and that the Commission had
"compelling reasons ... that [had] nothing to do with Kentucky's
competition with out-of-state businesses adopting some form of the
claiming rule," 63 and thus had an independent motivation for
establishing Article 6.64
Additionally, in observing a line of Supreme Court export
embargo cases, the court made another distinction. The court
noted that in the export embargo cases, compliance with the
regulation was unavoidable for each Commerce Clause litigant. 65
In contrast, the bench reasoned that Article 6 constituted a
"voluntarily-encountered regulation," as it applied only to claiming
races and had no application to private sales or public auctions of
thoroughbreds in Kentucky.66 Thus, Jamgotchian could have
avoided the Article 6 restrictions altogether. 67 The court held that
the temporary restrictions imposed by Article 6, by which
purchasers voluntarily avail themselves, are not "protectionist in
any meaningful way" and do not run afoul of the dormant
Commerce Clause.68

5

Id. at 615.

Id. (internal quotations removed).
I[d.
62 Id.
63 Id. (The court only made an oblique reference to "racing
integrity reasons," in
supporting the Commission's alternative reasons-as opposed to protectionism-for
adopting Article 6).
64 Id.
6 Id. at 618.
6 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 620-62 1.
3

61
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In fact, the temporal element of Article 6 seemed to deliver
the coup de gras to Jamgotchian's claim. The court concluded that
the facts presented, while mostly analogous, were dissimilar from
a line of other export embargo cases decided by the Supreme
Court.69 Specifically,

that "the differences are those between

permanent and temporary, between total and partial, between
70
serious and slight and between inescapable and voluntary." As
characterized by the court, the cases referenced disallowed the
exportation of an item of commerce entirely or disallowed it if the
71
exporter failed to fulfill some local requirement. The bench
reasoned that Jamgotchian "simply having to wait thirty days to
transfer his Kentucky-claimed horse ... or forty-two days to race in

72
another state" was hardly analogous. It did, however, cite a case
that it concluded was more factually analogous: Tennessee Scrap
Recyclers Association v. Bredesen. There, the Sixth Circuit upheld
a city ordinance requiring scrap dealers to "tag and hold scrap
metal for a period of ten days so that victims of metal theft and law
73
enforcement officials could inspect it." Although offering little
support for its claim, the court reasoned that Article 6, "similarly
limited in temporal scope and designed to advance a legitimate,
74
non-protectionist local interest,... [was] even less objectionable."

69 Id. (The Supreme Court has routinely struck down export embargoes. See, e.g.,
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 102 S. Ct. 1096, 71 L. Ed. 2d 188
(1982) (striking down a state's attempt to disallow export of electricity generated within the
state); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (striking down a requirement that
state-grown cantaloupes be packed within the state); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (striking down an Alaska statute that required timber taken
from state land be processed in Alaska before export). Despite admitting to the similarities,
such as Article 6 restrictions being triggered by acquiring property in Kentucky, and
restricting the export of that property so that it may be used in Kentucky, the court
explained that the listed cases were not controlling).
7o Id. (emphasis added).
7' Id.
7 2 Id.
73 Id. (The analogized regulation grew from the wake of a historic metal theft crime
wave in Tennessee-a state where scrap metal recycling is big business. Tennessee Scrap
Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that an ordinance likely
to increase storage costs and result in a competitive disadvantage for dealers did not violate
the Commerce Clause because the restriction was temporary, and did not unduly burden
interstate commerce or outweigh the interest in combatting theft)) (internal quotations

removed).
7

Id.
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IV. THE TEST: STRICT SCRUTINY

A. FacialDiscrimination
The result reached by the Kentucky Supreme Court not
only demonstrates that the court applied the wrong test, but also
that it disregarded the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. This is not one of those thorny
cases where the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly "with
only incidental effects on interstate commerce."7 5 In fact, the
discriminatory nature of the regulation at issue in Jamgotchianis
not even one that can only be known by its "discriminatory
effect."7 6 On its face, Kentucky's intent is clear: "Unless the
stewards grant permission for a claimed horse to enter and start
at an overlapping or conflicting meeting in Kentucky, a horse shall
notrace elsewhere until the close of entries of the meeting at which
it was claimed."7 7 As Justice Brennan explained in Hughes, "[s]uch
facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect, regardless of
the State's purpose, because 'the evil of protectionism can reside in
legislative means as well as legislative ends."'7 8 The Justice further
explained that "[alt a minimum, such facial discrimination invokes
the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and
of the absence of non-discriminatory alternatives."7 9
Notwithstanding the fact that the Kentucky Supreme
Court acknowledged that Article 6 was discriminatory-even if
ever so slightly-it nevertheless refused to undertake a strict
scrutiny analysis. The court concluded that the effects were
"negligible" relative to the benefits offered to the racing industry.8 0
They declared, however, that a law found to be discriminatory
"invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local

75 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

76 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)
(invalidating an Oklahoma
law that prevented the transport of minnows obtained in Oklahoma for sale outside the
state).
77 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:015 (1975) (emphasis added).
78 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 322 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S.
617, 626 (1978)).
J
Id.o
80 Jamgotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594, 610 (2016).
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purpose" and "face [s] a virtually per se rule of invalidity.""' While
acknowledging that any analysis involving the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine is inherently perplexing, Article 6 constitutes a
quintessential type of regulation that the Supreme Court has
identified as discriminatory towards interstate commerce: laws
82
that limit access to in-state resources. Regulations attempting to
minnows, milk,
an article of commerce-land,
preserve
electricity-for state residents by limiting use to non-residents
have not only required the application of strict scrutiny, but also
have been invalidated as violating the Dormant Commerce
Clause. 83
B. Economic Protectionism
As the abovementioned cases illustrate, the Supreme Court
requires more than simply a legitimate purpose; a regulation
attempting to prohibit access to resources must serve an important
84
purpose in order to be upheld. Erwin Chemerinsky, a prominent
United States Constitutional scholar, stated that "[alt the very
least, a state law that discriminates against interstate commerce
must be justified by a purpose that is unrelated to economic
protectionism."8 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[shielding in-state industries from out-of-state competitioncis
86
almost never a legitimate local purpose." The Kentucky Supreme
Court not only failed to undergo a strict scrutiny analysis after
identifying that the regulation was discriminatory, but it also
failed to identify an important purpose unrelated to economic
protectionism. Although the court reasoned that the Commission
87
did not adopt Article 6 with a "protectionist intent," the only
81 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 455.

Id. at 457; see City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(invalidated a law attempting to reserve its scarce landfill space for in-state refuse); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (invalidated a law
that prevented a landfill operator from accepting out-of-county waste); Hughes, 441 U.S.
322 (1979).
83 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 458.
84 Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
85 Id. (internal quotations removed); see also New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
86 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,148 (1986) (upheld a state ban on the importation
of live baitfish because it served a legitimate purpose that could not adequately be served
by available non-discriminatory alternatives).
87 Jamgotchian v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594,611 (2016).
82
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abstract rationale it provided of a "compelling" purpose was
"racing integrity reasons," and "deterring frivolous claiming
practices."8 8 Even as the court stressed the history of the claiming
race, and its many evolutions, it consistently expressed that its
central purpose was "to ensure the integrity and viability of
thoroughbred racing...," which is one of Kentucky's most vital
industries. 8 9
The true motivation behind the court's decision was best
articulated by the former vice president of racing at Del Mar: "We
don't want people coming in raiding our horses."90 Clearly, it is
difficult to divorce the intent of Article 6, as articulated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court itself, from the very form of "evil"economic protectionism-that invokes a strict scrutiny analysis.
Yet, by apparent misapplication of Supreme Court precedent, the
court applied the balancing test.
The Kentucky Supreme Court further reasoned that strict
scrutiny was inapplicable to Article 6 and that the regulation was
not protectionist in any meaningful way because the restriction's
temporary nature.9 ' Aside from the claim being seemingly
irrelevant, the court overstated the disposition of Tennessee Scrap
Recyclers Association v. Bredesen in attempting to support it. In
Bredesen, although the Sixth Circuit did elude that the temporary
nature of Memphis's "tag and hold" regulation was a relevant
consideration, it was in no way deemed dispositive. 92 Rather, the
court emphasized the fact that the regulation had an exceptionally
narrow scope-it did not apply to parties outside the city of
Memphis, and was plainly directed at curving a historicalmetal
theft crime wave. 93 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit explained that
"if [the] law [had] any out-of-state effect at all, that effect [was]
beneficial to out-of-state scrap dealers, as the ordinance
burdenled] their competitors in Memphis." 94 Moreover, the court
provided a clear line of reasoning as to why the "tag and hold"
regulation was not protectionist. These were the dispositive

8 Id. at 615.
89 Id. at 621.
90
Tracy
Gantz,

Claiming Jail, THOROUGHBRED
OWNERS OF CAL.,
http://www.toconline.com/publiationsmedia/article-archives-2/racing-your-horse/claimingjail/ [perma.cc/374G-N8591.
91 Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 618.
92 Tennessee Scrap Recyclers Ass'n v. Bredesen, 556
F.3d 442, 451 (6th Cir. 2009).
93 Bredesen, 556 F.3d at 450 (emphasis added).
94

Id.
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considerations taken by the court in reaching its holding-not the
length of the ten-day holding period itself.
Given the nature of the argument that Kentucky looked to
advance through Bredesen, that the restrictions were nonprotectionist due to being temporary in nature, it should be noted
that the U.S. Supreme Court has never clearly articulated any sort
of "de minimid' exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
Rather, the only relevant consideration is whether the given
regulation is justifiable. To whatever extent Bredesen may be
relevant, however, its "tag and hold" regulation is distinguishable
from Article 6.
First, the temporal scope of Article 6 is much broader. It
applies to all tracks in the state, not just the subdivisions thereof.
Also, Article 6 restrictions may lead to a prohibition of transfers
for up to 60 days, as opposed to the ten days required under the
"tag and hold" restriction. Though notable in and of itself, the
impact of that distinction is magnified when one considers the
industries to which each restriction applies. Not only does the
restriction under Article 6 bar claimants from using their property
to pursue earnings outside of Kentucky, but it also prohibits other
states from acquiring earnings in Kentucky-a state whose
second-largest track is located in a city nicknamed the "Horse
Capital of the World."
Second, Article 6 does not clearly advance a legitimate, nonprotectionist purpose-that is, Article 6 is not aimed at curtailing
any "historic" criminal activity. Rather, Article 6 is designed to
keep Kentucky's resources in-state for a specified period of time in
order to bolster its thoroughbred racing industry. Third, Article 6
is designed to do the aforementioned while protecting against outof-state competition. The regulation at issue in Bredesen cannot be
credibly analogized to Article 6 as a means of supporting the
proposition offered by the Kentucky Supreme Court in any
meaningful way. Also, it is no safe harbor for the court to argue
that Article 6 is not protectionist because "the vast majority of
tracks ...

95
elsewhere" have similar restrictions. As declared by

Justice Robert Jackson, the dormant Commerce Clause is
principally concerned with states acting to help themselves at the
expense of other states, resulting in those affected states
9 Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 615.
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subsequently retaliating with their own protectionist legislation. 96
Ironically, in anticipation of this accusation, the court states "lest
this situation be mistaken for the very sort of protectionist tit-fortat the Commerce Clause ... obviate[s]," before it went on to
reemphasize the purpose of Article 6.97 Not only does this
reasoning seem circular, as if it should be accepted as some selfevident proposition, but it begs credulity.
The argument that the regulation's limited duration dilutes
protectionism is also an insufficient defense. In fact, similar
arguments have been rejected by other state officials whose states
have regulations akin to Article 6. In a letter to the California
Horse Racing Board (CHRB), the Attorney General of California
penned "the proposed 60-day post-race meeting prohibitionof outof-state racing of a California claimed horse would have the effect
of controlling commercial activity occurring wholly outside the ...
state."9 8 He continued on to say that "the restriction is plainly
proposed only for economic reasons, as an effort to keep more
horses from leaving the state. California plainly cannot assert
extraterritorialjurisdiction such as here being considered"9 9
Although this letter was crafted by the CHRB in response to a
proposed extension of California's claiming jail by the CHRB, its
logic ultimately undermined the practice altogether. Not only did
the CHRB refuse to amend their claiming rule, but it disposed of
its claiming jail rules entirely shortly after receiving the Attorney
General's letter. Notably, Jamgotchian actually attached a copy of
this letter to his motion for summary judgment. Yet, in the face of
such clear language, the court simply disregarded the letter and
subsequent determination by the CHRB in the footnotes of its
opinion.100 Cue Upton Sinclair.
C ExtraterritorialReach
Pursuant to the logic of the Attorney General of California,
it would seem difficult to argue that Article 6 does not assert

See generallyH. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-539 (1949).
Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 615.
98 Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California,
to Roy C. Wood Jr.,
Executive Director of the California Horse Racing Board (Sept. 8, 2003) (emphasis added).
99 Id.
so See Jamzotchian. 488 S.W.3d at 615
96
9
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extraterritorial jurisdiction as well. It is clear, just as the CHRB
was made aware, that the Commission was regulating economic
10 1
activity occurring wholly outside of the state of Kentucky.
Persons who violate Article 6 regulations are subject to fines,
102 Accordingly, by
license suspension, and other sanctions.
enforcing these penalties, the state effectively placed a barrier
between claimants and other states hosting meets for a period of
up to a quarter of a year. This means that no state's track will have
access to any claimant's horses because of the claimant's natural
desire to avoid facing penalties.
Moreover, just as it was observed by the Attorney General,
Article 6 was proposed for economic reasons. In fact, there is no
doubt because the court not only said just that, but belabored the
point in its opinion.10 3 The court, however, arguably strained.to
distinguish the claim before it from well-settled Supreme Court
precedent by reasoning that "Article 6 is not an attempt by
Kentucky, directly or indirectly, to regulate horse racing (or any
104
other) activities in other states." This rationale appears to reflect
the notion that a state must have intended to indirectly regulate
the commerce of other states-it does not. Indeed, if the
extraterritoriality doctrine declares state laws that indirectly
regulate commerce occurring wholly outside of that state as invalid
per se, regardless of the regulation's effects in that state, then it
would appear that Article 6 warrants greater evaluation under the
doctrine than what the court credited it.
Similar to the rationale that it must be the states intention
to regulate extrastate commercial activity, it would appear equally
irrelevant that an "elsewhere state" did not require, as argued by
the court, in Jamgotchian, to violate Article 6.105 The
extraterritorial doctrine is principally concerned with the effects
on commerce caused by the state promulgating the challenged
regulation; not the actions of outside states.

Racing
101 Reply Brief for PlaintiffPetitioner at 3, Jamgotchian v. Ky. Horse
Com'n, 488 S.W.3d 594 (2016) (No. 16-171).
102 See 810 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:028 (2016).
103 Jamgotchian,488 S.W.3d at 604.
10 Id. at 620.
105 Id. at 615.
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D. Least Restrictive Alternative
The court further departed from Supreme Court
jurisprudential thought by not requiring the state to prove that it
employed the "least restrictive alternative" to achieve Article 6's
regulatory goal. The "least restrictive alternative" component is an
essential inquiry to the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
regardless of whether a court declares the challenged regulation
discriminatory, or non-discriminatory.1 0 6 The Kentucky Supreme
Court gave the state a pass in large part because, as characterized
by the court, Article 6 is "knowingly and voluntarily agreed to"
rather than an "unavoidable governmental regulation affecting all
commerce." 0 7 Aside from being analytically deficient, this
argument is beside the point. First, the rule was not established
by the private sector, but by the Commission acting under the
authority of the General Assembly. This qualification alone
removes Article 6 from that which is "knowingly and voluntarily
agreed to."
Second, a claimant is subject to Article 6 the moment they
chose to purchase a horse through a claiming race. The fact that
the claimant could have purchased a horse by other, privatemeans
is immaterial. This proposition is supported by the logic of
Supreme Court cases that involve attempts by states to limit
access to in-state resources. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, Hughes
would not have been subject to Oklahoma's regulation had he
purchased commercially farmed minnows, as opposed to fishing
them out of public waterways.1 08 Similarly, in South Central
Development Inc. v. Wunnicke, if South-Central had decided not
to directly purchase state-owned timber, it would not have been
required to have it semi-processed in Alaska. 0 9 Both Hughes and
South-Central, however, having alternatives was irrelevant to the
findings of the Supreme Court "because [its] proper focus [was] on

106 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at
450 (Yet the court has never
struck down a non-discriminatory law on the basis that the goal could have been achieved

by less burdensome means).

Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 610.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 345-46 (1979).
10 See generallySouth-Central Development Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(plurality opinion).
107
08
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11 0 In
where the state does discriminate, not where it does not."
short, there is no legal framework that provides a loophole-as
suggested by the Kentucky Supreme Court-around the "least
restrictive alternative" component.
The Supreme Court has clearly ruled when a state chooses
to discriminate against interstate commerce, the "burden falls on
the government" to establish the absence of either non1
discriminatory or less discriminatory alternatives." ' By placing
that burden on the government the court is able to detect where

"the evil of protectionism ... reside[s] in the legislative means [as
12
opposed to] legislative ends."1 Although the Commission had
every opportunity to do so, it failed to explain the lack of available
non-discriminatory options. Acting in total disregard, the
Commission failed to articulate why it had no way, other than that
which overtly discriminates against interstate commerce, to serve
13
its putative local purpose.1 In not requiring the Commission to
explain the absence of non- or less-discriminatory alternatives, the
court seemingly reasoned that the restrictions of claiming races
were necessary to "deter aggressive claiming practices" (e.g.,
raiding a state's thoroughbred horses).114
If the Commission is concerned about maintaining fuller
fields by discouraging claimants from entering claimed horses in
out-of-state meets, why not simply increase the purchase price of
horses entered into claiming races? Alternatively, why not increase
the price of claiming races? Paraphrasing a basic economic
principle, the Law of Demand states that, all else being equal, a
1 15
higher price leads to a lower quantity demanded. Moreover, this
principle captures the idea that for a sufficiently high price, each
owner would be more willing to risk losing their horse to a
claimant. The effectiveness of either alternative is unclear, but it
is unacceptable that the Commission refused to explain why they
had no other option to maintain racing integrity than that which
precisely discriminates against interstate commerce.

Iio Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Petitioner, supra note 101, at 3.
"

See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353

(1977).

112 See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Petitioner, supra note 101, at 3 (citing Hughes,
441 U.S. at 322 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978))).
113 See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38.
(Ky.
114 Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594, 614
2016).
115

Law

of

Demand,

INVESTOPEDIA,

https://www.investopedia.com/terms//lawofdemand.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
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If the Commission had explained why they selected their
choice, it appears unlikely that they would have been able to
establish that Article 6 constituted the least discriminatory
alternative given its protectionist qualities. As briefly discussed
supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court itself seemingly spoke to the
protectionist nature of Article 6. The court reasoned that:
Article 6 restrictions, because of their limited
duration-about three months maximum-have a
minimal effect, if any, on interstate commerce,
whereas their benefit to Kentucky's thoroughbred
racing industry, an industry, of course, in which
Kentucky takes a keen interest, both economically
and culturally, is substantial. As the trial court saw
it, the Article 6 restrictions, by tending to counteract
one of the drains on the supply of horses competing
at a given meet, encouragelargerrace fields at that
meet, which in turn increasesthe interestinand the
amount of money wagered on races, a benefit
resultingin largerpurses, payoffs, handle, and tax
receipts to all the interestsinvolved.16
Given such a glaring concession, the court's misapplication
of Supreme Court precedent seems clear.11 7 Hindering "the
reallocation of economic resources to their highest-valued use" for
a period of up to three months is no minimal effect, and it is no
answer to generally claim that your state has a substantial
economic interest in that resource.11 8
CONCLUSION
This Note proposed the appropriate test that the Kentucky
Supreme Court should have applied in its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. Whether Article 6's claiming jail requirement
would have survived a strict scrutiny analysis is unclear; what is
" 6 Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 601 (emphasis added).
"7 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) (noting that
state
statute that clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is "unconstitutional unless
the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism ... ").
" Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
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clear, however, is that Article 6-as observed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court-is discriminatory and protectionist. It is also
clear that the Kentucky Supreme Court failed to require the
Commission to address possible non- or less discriminatory
alternatives to the Article 6 restrictions. Consequently, it is
abundantly clear that Kentucky's application of the Pike balancing
test was inappropriate. The state's highest bench applied the test
which conveniently permitted them to express their own policy
bias. Such ideological bias is the very reason why several Supreme
Court justices-objecting to applications of the balancing testhave argued that it is a mechanism "ill-suited to the judicial
function."1 19
Most notably, Justice Scalia expressed that "this process is
ordinarily called balancing, but the scale analogy is not really
are
sides
interests on both
the
since
appropriate,
20
judging
like
more
is
"it
continued,
he
Rather,
incommensurate."1
12 1 The
whether a particular line is longer than a rock is heavy."
goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to prevent states from
interstate
or unduly burdening
against
discriminating
protectionism.
economic
of
form
commerce-particularly in the
Here, foregoing the arbitrariness of the balancing test in favor of a
strict scrutiny analysis would have removed the Kentucky
Supreme Court's judicial bias and better served this goal.

n1 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. 1idwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (internal quotations removed).
121 Id.

